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Editor’s note: Iryna Hoiuk is The Fix’s contributor and Project Manager at the Lviv Media Forum, an NGO supporting the Ukrainian media community. In this piece she shares key excerpts from the organisation’s new report on countering Russian propaganda narratives about Ukraine in Western media, republished with the authors’ permission.
Over a year into the full-scale invasion, Russia’s war against Ukraine remains front and centre of news coverage in many European countries.
For a new study, Lviv Media Forum researched the news landscape in five European countries – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Latvia, and France – to figure out how this coverage looks like, what are some common mistakes, and how journalists can improve their work.
“For our study, we deliberately chose newsrooms that consider professional ethics and standards vital for their work, and which have an established reputation among their readers. The full-scale invasion of Russia raised a wave of interest in propaganda narratives due to their destructive influence on society”, says Olha Myrovych, CEO at Lviv Media Forum, fundraising consultant, and expert in media development.
Let’s look at the most common Russian propaganda narratives that make their way to European news coverage and what can be done to avoid them, as defined by the report.
Researchers highlighted the following narratives promoted by Russian propaganda:
Other problematic statements include:
In France, the media aims for balance by featuring opinions from Russian politicians and pseudo-experts but lacks Ukrainian perspectives in French, the study finds. Correspondents who worked in Russia have shaped the perception of events in Eastern Europe of many French media outlets. Discussions on Twitter tend to have limited representation of the Ukrainian position.
A new pro-Russian publication Omerta has emerged in the country, while Russian state-run outlets like Russia Today and Sputnik remain blocked thanks to the sanctions. Media professionals acknowledge the effectiveness of Russian “soft power” as a supplement to propaganda in the economy and cultural diplomacy.
German media workers note the influence of Russian propaganda, including calls to force Ukraine into peace. Correspondents frequently visit Ukraine, interacting with experts, spokespeople, and journalists. Military aid to Ukraine and refugees receive significant attention. However, the media often portrays Ukraine as corrupt, overlooks progress, and depicts Ukraine’s attempts to curb the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church as oppression.
Widespread beliefs exist about the greatness of Russian culture, separate from Putin’s regime, and Russia’s unique role in defeating Nazism. Fear-mongering by Russian propaganda regarding German reliance on Russian energy has not materialised, and society now accepts anti-Russian sanctions more readily.
Italian media prioritise domestic issues and report on Ukraine mainly concerning Italian interests or most important news. Correspondents sent to Ukraine are relatively few, leading to a need for more up-to-date information on Ukrainian affairs. Business representatives who have suffered losses from anti-Russian sanctions call for “peace at any cost.”
Pro-Russian rhetoric from politicians is also present in the Italian media, with some attempting to “reconcile” Ukraine and Russia by setting certain conditions for peace. Some cases present Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories as self-determination and compare it to Italy’s South Tyrol region.
In Hungary, the government controls most media outlets, which promote the idea that the country should not be “dragged into the war” and should maintain cooperation with Russia. Anti-Western rhetoric and criticism of anti-Russian sanctions are common in pro-government public media. Independent media cannot counter this discourse.
“Independent newsrooms do not have the same resources and influence as pro-government media. Journalists highlight that even government-controlled media criticise the government every now and then. But that’s relevant only for domestic political issues, and not in relation to foreign policy vectors,” says Zoya Krasovska, a media analyst at the Lviv Media Forum.
There is misinformation about the situation in the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, including claims of “language oppression” and of selective mobilisation of ethnic Hungarians into the military. The media and experts lack information on Ukraine despite Hungary being a neighbouring country.
Latvia experiences strong Russian influences in its media space, but the government and society support Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists are invited to participate in public discourse, which pays much attention to the situation in Ukraine. Pro-Russian narratives appear due to the use of Russian sources and the language barrier. The national regulator combats pro-Russian propaganda.
The revocation of Dozhd licence was viewed ambiguously in Latvian media community. Some organisations try to reconcile Ukrainian refugees and Russian immigrants through joint programs. Misinformation exists regarding alleged Ukrainian “Russophobia” and the alleged damage to the Latvian economy due to its support of Ukraine.
Olha Myrovych says that many newsrooms are reviewing their editorial practices and trying to be more sensitive to the language they use in their materials. As more and more evidence points to the genocidal nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the media narratives surrounding it will remain the focus of experts and ordinary citizens around the world.
How can newsrooms counter the spread of Russian propaganda narratives? Here’s the advice the report offers to news publishers and authorities:
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