Russia’s full-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2024 was promptly followed by the introduction of military censorship laws, which shattered the Russian media landscape. While state-funded media kept pouring out propaganda messaging, foreign publications with Russian editions exited the market, local media outlets ceased their operations, and many journalists left the country, trying to stay in the business by establishing new media ventures abroad.

Three years later, with the war still ongoing, challenges seem to – more quietly than in the early days of the conflict – pile up. Russian media outlets, which try to navigate the current unfavourable climate and serve its audiences as a valuable source of information, seem to face three cross-cutting obstacles: financial sustainability, self-censorship, and news fatigue.

The money problem

“If we ranked the problems of Russian media, I would say money would probably be the biggest one,” says Russia media researcher Vasily Gatov. “Regardless of whether they’re in or outside of Russia. At present, almost 100% of Russian media is not profitable.”

While in today’s Russia, media outlets are either subsidised by the state, the regions where they operate, state-owned companies, or entertainment businesses, outside of Russia, many media outlets opposing the war and the regime have been labelled “foreign agents” or “undesirable organisations”. Beyond the legal burdens these designations carry, they severely limit their funding options: advertisers might not want to be associated with the brand, and donations or subscriptions could compromise individuals for supporting such outlets. 

If we ranked the problems of Russian media, I would say money would probably be the biggest one

Russia media researcher Vasily Gatov

As a result, these media outlets have become heavily reliant on foreign grants, which, as the most recent US aid freeze revealed, cannot build a foundation for a stable funding model. “They still live, but it’s other people’s charity that lets them live. So, I hope there will still be resources to support them,” Gatov says. 

Self-censorship

When discussing censorship in Russia, we often refer to the laws introduced by the Kremlin at the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which don’t allow mentioning the invasion with any other terms than a “special military operation”  and in a positive light. 

These laws, which were one of the main reasons why both foreign and local journalists left the country, have been crippling for Russian media, and even more so for regional media, for which it is even more difficult to operate from abroad. “For regional media, it is quite difficult for them to exist in isolation from the region,” Anastasia Sechina, the coordinator of Chetvyorty Sector (“Fourth Sector”), a non-profit media initiative offering support to Russian regional journalism, notes. “Therefore, all military censorship restrictions affect them most directly.”

Sometimes, however, simply following censorship laws isn’t always enough, Sechina notes. Stories that are unfavourable to the authorities can also result in regional outlets losing their media licences, as seen with Saratov’s Free News and St Petersburg’s MR7. “These publications tried to follow the rules set by the authorities,” she adds. “However, this didn’t prevent them from losing their media registration certificates, which has marginalised them to some extent in the eyes of the authorities, and possibly parts of society.”

Meanwhile, Gatov indicates censorship does not conform to the country’s borders. “When you leave your country, your relatives remain there. For Putin’s regime, there are no borders, no limitations to harass your mother, father, brother, sister, who have nothing to do with your business or your journalism. They already demonstrated it on several examples,” he says.

In the case of exiled media, which currently heavily relies on grants, securing funding is another major concern. “You have to consider that some of your opinions or some of your work may harm relations with the sponsor,” Gatov adds. 

News fatigue

Three years of constant negative news have taken a toll on consumers, who have begun distancing themselves from stories on war and political oppression, especially as no solution appears in sight.  

Sechina observes that national media outlets with regional focus have noticed this growing audience fatigue. “They see the audience’s exhaustion, the decline in coverage, and how people are starting to tune out,” she explains. “They understand they are losing relevance and value for their readers and need to offer something that will keep them engaged.”

In response, these outlets are adjusting their editorial policies to reduce their emphasis on political oppression and the war. Meanwhile, lifestyle media seem to enjoy a much better position. These publications appeal to regional audiences who are exhausted by negativity and constant worry, preferring content that focuses on daily life, relaxation, family, and topics removed from ongoing crises.

Interestingly, media focusing on regional issues still retain some value to local audiences – in the moments when those communities begin facing challenges directly themselves. But until then, many prefer to escape rather than confront the difficult realities presented in the news.

What’s next? 

Who is most likely to do well against all these challenges? Among regional projects, Sechina highlights the financial model of St Petersburg’s Bumaga as an example. It relies on various revenue streams, including club memberships and a VPN (virtual private network) service, while continually exploring new ways to generate income. 

“Unfortunately, most publications now rely on just one pillar, two at best,” Sechina notes. There’s one more catch: growing multiple financial streams requires proper management of each one. “If you’ve established a pillar, you need someone to manage it. This is a challenging process,” she says.  “Without the resources to hire a manager, it’s highly unlikely that you’ll be able to expand that pillar.”

Meanwhile, among publications operating in exile, Gatov argues that large, established organizations with experience in fundraising, such as the Latvia-based Meduza or the Amsterdam-based TV Rain, are more likely to survive under current conditions. Another way to survive would be adjusting projects to the Russian diaspora, like developing media addressing a Russian community in larger cities such as Berlin or Warsaw. “It requires readjustment of ambitions, which is very difficult,” he notes.

Personal projects will also still be around. “There will always be personal media projects, where individuals take on the responsibilities of organized media and try to handle them alone. With certain professionalism and calculation, they can make it,” Gatov adds, giving the YouTube channel of Yury Dud, who conducts long, entertaining interviews with public figures, as an example.

Source of the cover photo: Pixabay via Pexels


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