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For many years Russia has been mobilising the resources at its disposal to discredit Ukraine and other enemies, both through media outlets in Russia and abroad. Since 2014, Russian state-linked media outlets have been spreading disinformation to influence people’s minds and distort the truth about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From the start of the full-scale war in 2022, the tactics became as aggressive as ever before.
A year ago the Russian propaganda machine faced a stiff and unprecedented rebuke in Europe. The West imposed sanctions on Russian outlets to protect their societies from manipulations. The European Union banned Russian state media such as Russia Today and Sputnik. Journalists, governments and disinformation experts have been working on analysing the Russian fake news system and manipulations to effectively counteract it.
Russian propaganda has so far failed to win over hearts and minds of most Europeans – or to scare them into tacit acceptance of Russia’s war against Ukraine – but it hasn’t stopped trying.
The European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service which manages foreign communication and crisis response, presented its first report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) in February. They analysed a sample of 100 information manipulation attempts; 88 of them were orchestrated by Russian state actors.
The Fix summarised key points of the report.
Russian propaganda has a few sets of targets they focus on. The analysis divides propaganda’s targets in three groups: countries, organisations, and individuals. Unsurprisingly, the most common are Ukraine, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Ukrainian allies, such as the European Union and international institutions like NATO.
One of the goals of the EEAS report was to define narratives that Russia uses in media outlets. The report established five of the most popular ones:
Russia uses different types of media to spread its narratives. The EEAS report divided online media outlets into three groups: official communication channels, state-controlled channels, and state-linked media channels. Diplomatic channels are widely used by the Russian government to propagate ideas to online audiences.
Apart from the three previous groups of channels, the Russian media ecosystem also relies on non-attributed channels. These channels do not have an obvious connection between them and do not have clear attribution. Non-attributed channels could be linked by other pieces of evidence. The channels can be interlinked by similar media content, linguistic, political context, follows, cross-posting, economic ties etc.
Threat actors choose popular social media platforms to distribute content: Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook. Also, they are using news outlets and websites of public bodies, discussion, and video-sharing platforms. They fabricate images and video-based content to distribute material across multiple platforms to maximise coverage. (For instance, Russia created a deep fake video with President Volodymyr Zelensky telling Ukrainian troops to surrender).
Russian state propaganda creates content in different languages to reach different audiences abroad. Most widespread are Russian and English, but there are also about 30 different languages analysed in the EEAS report.
Russian propagandist media outlets use impersonation as a tool to add legitimacy to their messages.
False covers imitate the style of European satirical magazines such as Charlie Hebdo (France), Titanic (Germany), and EL Jueves (Spain). As an example (not mentioned directly in the report), the fake cover of Charlie Hebdo magazine was shared on the internet, especially by Russians, as a real one. The magazine has an archive of all covers and after checking the journalists found out that this one was never made by Charlie Hebdo.
Furthermore, two videos copy international media Aljazeera and Euronews. There is a case where a fake animated video pretends to be an official one by the European Security and Defence College. It listed disadvantages of Ukraine joining NATO using an AI-generated voice.
An investigation of these cases showed that one was originally published by non-attributed channels and one by a Russian-attributed channel which seemed to be the original publisher of Euronews’ impersonating video. In all incidents, threat actors mainly aimed to discredit Ukraine and the Ukrainian government.
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